CERIAS Security Seminar: HomeRun: High-efficiency Oblivious Message Retrieval, Unrestricted
Description
Speaker:
Yanxue Jia
Purdue University
Abstract: Oblivious Message Retrieval is designed to protect the privacy of users who retrieve messages from a bulletin board. Our work, HomeRun, stands out by providing unlinkability across multiple requests for the same recipient's address. Moreover, it does not impose a limit on the number of pertinent messages that can be received by a recipient, which thwarts "message balance exhaustion" attacks and enhances system usability. HomeRun also empowers servers to regularly delete the retrieved messages and the associated auxiliary data, which mitigates the constantly increasing computation costs and storage costs incurred by servers. Remarkably, none of the existing solutions offer all of these features collectively.
About: Yanxue Jia is currently a post-doctoral researcher in the Department of Computer Science at Purdue University. In 2022, she obtained her Ph.D. in Computer Science from Shanghai Jiao Tong University. Her research mainly focuses on applied cryptography, especially secure computation, blockchain, and provable security. She is dedicated to designing efficient and secure cryptographic protocols that enhance collaboration while ensuring privacy protection. Her work has been published at top-tier conferences, such as USENIX Security, CCS, and Asiacrypt. For more detailed information about her academic and research background, please refer to her homepage https://yanxue820.github.io/
The weekly security seminar has been held every semester since spring of 1992. We invite personnel at Purdue and visitors from outside to present on topics of particular interest to them in the areas of computer and network security, computer crime investigation, information warfare, information ethics, public policy for computing and security, the computing "underground," and other related topics. More info
Contact Details
- Lori Floyd
- laf@purdue.edu
- (765) 494-7841